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A prominent, perhaps defining feature of ‘nanotechnology’ is its interest from the very beginning to 
evaluate its own promise and peril.  As Arie Rip has pointed out, this has produced a kind of 1
‘division of moral labor’ which is perhaps not unlike the division of labor between physicists who 
develop analytic tools and chemists who investigate properties of matter (Shelley-Egan and Rip, 
2009). As in all divisions of labor, one often does not and perhaps need not know very much about 
the problems and methods that guide the work on the other side of the divide. On the side of 
scientists and policy makers there appears to be a tacit agreement that philosophy can be equated 
with ethics, that philosophers articulate widely shared concerns, and that lists of issues regarding the 
safety and social implications of nanotechnology create a kind of interface with larger publics. 
Indeed, the participation of a philosopher in a nanotech conference sometimes serves as a stand-in 
for the inclusion of society at large.  
 There is much to be said about this caricature of what philosophers can and cannot contribute by     
way of reflection on emerging technologies. Here, a strong case is made for the role of the 
philosophy of science or, more precisely, the philosophy of technoscience. Rather than leap ahead to 
ethical issues, the philosophy of technoscience reflects what ‘nanotechnology’ is. This 
understanding is a precondition for the identification and consideration of ethical, societal, and 
regulatory issues. In particular, then, this chapter aims to show how specific challenges to the 
 This is an area of common ground between the visionary pioneers of nanotechnology and various policy initiatives all 1
over the world, for some early examples see Roco and Bainbridge (2001), Roco and Tomellini (2002), or Roco (2003).
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regulation of nanotechologies arise from the very nature of nanotechnology and nanotechnological 
research.  2
 What ‘nanotechnology’ is cannot be learned from scientific definitions, for example, regarding     
the discovery, understanding, and technological potential of scale-dependently discontinuous 
properties at the nanoscale. Instead of asking for a definition, one might ask questions like these:  
1. Where does nanotechnology come from?  
2. What is the relation between science and technology in the case of nanotechnologies and, in 
particular, what kind of knowledge underwrites nanotechnological developments?  
3. What does it take to control properties and processes at the nanoscale and what is special 
about the objects that are encountered and constructed in nanotech laboratories?  
4. What are the scientific and technological mindsets of those who pursue more or less 
pronounced visions of technical control at the molecular level, and how do these compare to 
the implicit ideals that guide traditional pursuits of chemistry, materials science, physics, 
molecular biology or semiconductor research? 
By way of introduction, a very brief review of four philosophical questions serves to illustrate how 
from a basic understanding of ‘nanotechnoscience’ one can begin to see salient societal and ethical 
dimensions. Though some of these touch on regulatory issues already, the second part of this 
chapter will explore rather more specific connections between nanotechnoscience and the regime of 
vigilance that is required for monitoring and regulating it. This will culminate in a proposal for a 
type of governance and a type of agency which is based on this understanding. 
I.  PHILOSOPHY OF NANOTECHNOSCIENCE  3
Although it sounds somewhat contrived, the term ‘nanotechnoscience’ serves well to express the 
difficulty of distinguishing between nanoscience and nanotechnology. Of course, much 
nanotechnological research is very fundamental and far removed from practical applications. 
Moreover, a great deal of scientific knowledge and experience goes into the acquisition of basic 
capabilities to visualise and manipulate, to model and functionalise novel nanoscale phenomena. 
 Of course, there is no such thing as a unified and coherent ‘nanotechnology’ in the singular. However, the persistence 2
of the expression in the singular is itself part of the ‘nanotechnology phenomenon’ (see Hodge, Bowman and Maynard 
in the Introduction to this volume). The term in the singular highlights some general features which pose regulatory 
challenges: heterogeneity of processes and products, limits of understanding and technical control at the nanoscale, and 
problems of foresight.
 This section provides a brief synopsis and adopts some of its formulations from Alfred Nordmann (2008a).3
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Nevertheless, this research does not fit standard conceptions of ‘science’ because the point of its 
investigations is not normally to question received views and to establish new truths, nor is it to 
produce conjectures and then try to falsify them, or to develop theories that close important gaps in 
our understanding of the world. Inversely, even though nanoscale research practice involves a good 
bit of tinkering and pursues technological challenges and promises, it is also not ‘engineering’ 
because most researchers are not in the business of building devices for more or less immediate use. 
At best, they lay the groundwork for concrete engineering projects in the future. Nanotechnological 
research is therefore somewhere ‘in between’ science and technology and has been described by 
Peter Galison (2006: 1) as an ‘engineering way of being in science’.  
 For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the philosophy of science addressed some     
very general questions about physics, chemistry and biology. Often scientists and philosophers 
engaged in this together, philosophical reflection serving purposes internal to each of these fields by 
strengthening a sense of disciplinary identity. Similarly, the philosophy of technoscience addresses 
foundational questions to nanotechnological research. Four questions might make a beginning:  
1. What is the role of theory and theory-development in nanoscale research, and what kinds of 
theories are needed for nanotechnological development? 
2. What are the preferred modes of reasoning and methods and associated tools in 
nanoscientific research? 
3. How is the domain of objects of nanotechnoscience constituted? 
4. What kind of knowledge do technoscientific researchers typically produce and 
communicate? 
5.
In all four cases, strictly philosophical considerations shade into societal dimensions and questions 
of value with implications also for regulatory questions.  So, what is meant by each of these 4
questions? 
a) Theories as Tools 
The philosophy of nanotechnoscience needs to come to terms with a fundamental tension that 
informs the very idea of nanotechnology. Indeed, without this tension nanotechnology would be 
 It should be noted, however, that the philosophy of technoscience is a new endeavor in its own right. What in the 4
following is presented as findings of a philosophy of nanotechnoscience has not been subjected as of yet to the kind of 
rigorous debate that is characteristic of the philosophy of science. Accordingly, the following analyses provide a rough 
and preliminary sketch.
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impossible and uninteresting. The intellectual and technical challenge posed by the control of 
nanoscale processes and properties consists in the fact that there is novelty and surprise at the 
nanoscale which owes largely to the features of the nanocosm as an intermediary realm between the 
worlds of classical and quantum physics or chemistry. On the one hand, this novelty and surprise 
results from the fact that each in their own way, classical and quantum theories do not quite account 
for processes and events at the nanoscale. On the other hand, the available theories and techniques 
are considered resourceful enough when it comes to modeling or explaining what goes on at the 
nanoscale.  
 A characteristic tension concerning nanotechnology as a whole is therefore mirrored in an     
analogous tension regarding available theories. Nanotechnology is thought to be strange, novel, and 
surprising on the one hand, familiar and manageable on the other. The available theories are thought 
to be inadequate on the one hand but quite sufficient on the other. The profound difference between 
classical and quantum regimes highlights what makes the nanocosm special and interesting – but 
this difference melts down to a matter of expediency and taste when it comes to choosing tools from 
classical or quantum physics (Nordmann, 2004). Put yet another way: What makes nanoscale 
phenomena scientifically interesting is that they cannot be adequately described from either 
perspective, but what makes nanotechnologies possible is that the two perspectives make do when it 
comes to account for these phenomena. 
 Nanotechnology thus appears as a technology that is not based on or grounded in theories that     
are predictively adequate to the phenomena at the nanoscale. Instead, it uncovers novelty and 
surprise and then proceeds to show that the available toolbox of theories is big enough to allow for 
modeling or explaining the novel processes and surprising phenomena. It is easy to see that this has 
implications for regulatory ambitions. Most everyone approaches nanotechnological unknowns on 
the assumption that known frameworks, theories and techniques can be stretched far enough to 
sufficiently account for the unknown. By wagering on this, one tends to be slow, even reluctant to 
acknowledge that one just doesn't have and perhaps will never have the knowledge that would be 
required. Currently, the case of nanotoxicology exemplifies this pattern all too well. Readers of the 
Introduction to this volume will notice how swiftly one moves from the conceptual simplicity of 
applying a conventional risk assessment paradigm to the qualification that definitive answers might 
be years away and available only on a case-by-case basis. And it then turns out that this sobering 
insight is only the first in a dauntingly long list of rather principled difficulties that call into 
question, for example, the adequacy of stretching mass-based regulatory approaches to 
nanoparticles. At the end of that list, the initial conceptual simplicity has all but dissolved. All this 
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suggests that demands for the regulation of nanoparticles as chemicals are short-changed in two 
ways: On the one hand, there is insufficient data, on the other hand, there is not yet enough 
reflection on those fundamental barriers that might require a whole new approach – what is most 
needed, perhaps, is a very frank acknowledgment that it is not an option to wait for the kind of 
knowledge that everyone is waiting for in order to apply the conventional risk assessment paradigm. 
On the basis of this acknowledgment, one might then develop more appropriate alternative 
approaches.  
b) Qualitative Reasoning 
Another essential endeavor of any philosophy of technoscience is the analysis of methods – what 
are the characteristic methods of nanotechnological research and how well do they work? Following 
immediately on the reflections about the role of theory, one can note that despite its strong debt to 
physics, chemistry, or biology, this research follows a qualitative and not a quantitative 
methodology.  
 Here, ‘quantitative’ means more than the employment of numbers and even of precision     
measurements. Two characteristics, in particular, may serve to define a quantitative method: First, 
predicted numerical values are compared to values obtained by measurement. The reasonably close 
agreement between two numbers thus serves to establish the agreement of theory and reality. 
Second, this quantitative agreement emphatically makes do without any appeal to a likeness or 
similarity between theoretical models and the real-world systems they are said to represent. 
Quantitative science rests content if it reliably leads from initial conditions to accurate predictions. 
It does not require that every detail of its conceptual apparatus (every term in its algorithms) has a 
counterpart in reality. Both characteristics of quantitative science are familiar especially from 
twentieth century theoretical physics – but do they also serve to characterise nanotechnoscience? 
 A general answer may not be possible here. But it can be shown that a very prominent approach     
to the investigation of nanoscale phenomena does not fit this description of quantitative method. 
This approach involves the construction in the laboratory (‘in vitro/in vivo’) of a so-called 
apparatus-world complex that affords, for example, the controlled growth of carbon-nanotubes 
(Harré, 2003). And then one constructs in a computer (‘in silico’) another apparatus-world complex 
that affords a ‘calculated image’ or simulation of the behavior of the carbon-nanotubes. The likeness 
between experimental and calculated images, between in vivo and in silico situations is taken to be 
a significant achievement. It is to signify that the experiment and the simulation follow the same 
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dynamic. Supposedly, the likeness is not just accidental or even illusory: if two systems exhibit the 
same behavior, they are thought to share in the same reality. In other words, the visualised behavior 
that is pieced together from familiar algorithms and bits of theory in a computer simulation is taken 
to explain the material behavior in the laboratory. The simulation thus serves the purpose of 
explanation just to the extent that the observable likeness of the two behaviors indicatess that both 
systems express the same dynamics, that they have a natural kinship in that they participate in the 
same underlying reality. 
 Again, this all too brief philosophical characterisation of method has obvious implications well     
beyond the narrow confines of philosophy. Both of these implications are not normally considered 
to be of regulatory relevance or concern, but they shape public perceptions and understanding of 
nanotechnology to such an extent that they can produce unrealistic expectations of what regulation 
can deliver. 
 First, qualitative reasoning that is stimulated by visual likeness draws our attention to the power     
of images and of the visual in nanotechnology. Indeed, by shifting from quantitative coordinations 
of numerical values to the construction of qualitative likeness, from the conventional representation 
of reality to the symbolic substitution of one reality by another, nanotechnoscience has become 
beholden to the power of images. It is fairly easy to see that images from the nanocosm are at this 
point still the most impressive as well as popular nanotechnological products. Art historians and 
theorists like William Mitchell (2005) or Hans Belting (2001), in particular, have emphasised the 
difference between: i) conventional signs that serve the purpose of representation, and ii) pictures or 
images that embody visions and desires, that cannot be controlled in that they are not mere vehicles 
of information but produce an excess of meaning that is not contained in a conventional message. 
For example, it is commonly maintained that nanosized things consist only of surface and have no 
bulk. This is what makes them intellectually and technically interesting. But pictures of the 
nanocosm invariably show objects with very familiar bulk-surface proportions, a world that looks 
perfectly suited for conventional technical constructions. Thus, once again we might be facing the 
predicament that our way of grasping at the nanoscale and our way of imagining it may foster an 
illusion of technical as well as regulatory control. Images show us only what agrees with our visual 
expectations that have been trained at a macroscopic scale, they do not normally reflect upon 
themselves or lead us to question what we see. Relying very much on imagery to make sense of 
nanotechnology, we do not learn what the limits of nanotechnical constructions and control might 
be, but think it quite ordinary like any other technology. 
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 Second, when the likeness or similarity of two things is taken to be a deeply meaningful token of     
a natural kinship, philosophers and historians of science tend to relate this to prescientific magical 
thinking. The pseudo-science of physiognomy, for example, is based on the idea that there is a 
meaningful likeness between the facial features and the character of a person. Voodoo-practitioners 
may want to cause harm to a person by sticking needles in a doll, and they do so upon the 
conviction that the person is somehow in the doll and that the doll participates in the reality of the 
person (Nordmann, 2006a). The magical thinking of nanoscientists is much more trustworthy and 
robust than all that, of course.  And yet, this draws attention to a variety of ways nanotechnoscience 5
and its associated imagery cultivate a magical relation to technology. It can be said, for example, 
that in the earlier days of humankind people were confronted with an enchanted and uncanny nature 
that needed to be soothed by praying to the spirits that dwelled in rocks and trees. Modern science 
and technology tamed and rationalised nature in a piece-meal fashion. Technology represents the 
extent to which we managed to defeat a spirited, enchanted world and subjected it to our control – 
we technologised nature. In the age of nanotechnoscience, however, visitors of science museums 
are invited to marvel at engineering feats, to imagine the incredible tininess of nano and a kind of 
technological agency well beneath the threshold of human perception or experience. We are also 
invited  to pin societal hopes for technological innovation on the creation of systems that display a 
dynamics as inscrutable and complex  as that of natural systems – it appears that we set out to 
naturalise technology. However, to naturalize technology would amount to replacing rational 
control over brute environments by dependency on mysterious functioning of smart environments. 
We may thus end up rendering technology just as uncanny as nature used to be with its earth-
quakes, diseases, thunderstorms (Nordmann, 2006b, 2008).  6
 To the extent that the regulation of substances, processes, and products aims for public oversight,     
political transparency and legal certainty, it needs to countenance and, if need be, to offer 
correctives to a view of nanotechnology that is shaped by images that tend to overwhelm critical 
thinking and that mostly marvels at all that nanotechnology might be able to do. 
 It is one of the tasks of the philosophy of nanotechnoscience, however, to explicate what warrants this kind of 5
reasoning.
 This is a strong indictment not of particular nanotechnologies but of certain ways of propagating our 6
nanotechnological future. Considered another way, it is simply an engineering challenge to design nanotechnology for 
the human scale.
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c) Domain of Objects 
Any field of research is directed at a certain domain of objects and what unifies this domain is a 
particular way of conceiving these objects. Mechanics, for example, looks at all phenomena of 
motion and everything that can be assigned coordinates in time and space and that has mass 
becomes the object of mechanics and is of interest only in regard to those properties that make it an 
object of motion. The philosophy of science articulates this world-view of mechanics and asks, for 
example, to what extent certain conceptions of time and space prejudice the investigation of objects 
in motion. If one now asks about nanotechnological research, the philosophy of technoscience may 
offer something like the following characterisation of its domain of objects: Nanotechnological 
research considers properties, traits, or features in regard primarily to their potential to serve a 
technical function, and in regard only incidentally to structure. 
 Clearly this requires elaboration and perhaps debate within the philosophy of technoscience,     
especially regarding the relation of property and underlying structure. For now, we can see the 
problems with this way of conceiving the objects of nanotechnology as they affect also regulatory 
interests: Nanotechnology opens an unlimited space of technical possibilities and thus presents itself 
as too amorphous and unwieldy for both political deliberation and, arguably, deliberate regulatory 
intervention. It is unlimited in two dimensions. First, the objects of nanotechnology do not have 
fixed and definite substantial natures but are mere potentials. Substantial natures determine what 
something is – a stone is hard as a rock. Considered as a mere potential, the stone is what it might 
become, that is, it is a momentary configuration of atoms and molecules that could be turned into 
just about anything else.  Second, if one considers nanotechnology as concerned with a universe of 7
lego-blocks that can be combined and recombined to ‘shape the world atom by atom,’ each given 
thing stands for an infinity of combinatorial possibilities that await to be realised in the future.  8
Accordingly, when one talks of nanotechnology, people will point to nature's nanotechnology and 
some accomplishments of materials science as examples of what nanotechnology is, but they will 
always point out that these are mere signs for future developments. The ‘real’ nanotechnology and 
 The example of the stone is taken from a book by Gerd Binnig where he argues that from the point of view of 7
nanotechnology, a stone has the potential to become anything else (Binnig, 1992).
 Shaping the World Atom by Atom is not a slogan by Eric Drexler and proponents of far-fetched schemes for molecular 8
manufacturing. It is the title of the brochure that was meant to introduce policy makers and  the US-American public to 
the National Nanotechnology Initiative (Amato, 1999). With the notion of an unlimited space of combinatorial 
possibilities comes  the transgressive character of nanotechnoscience which prompts many calls for regulation. 
Categorial distinctions of living and inanimate, organic and inorganic, biological and technical things, of nature and 
culture appear to become meaningless. This is so even though hardly any researcher believes literally in brain implants 
to expand human memory or in the infinite plasticity of everything molecular. The molecular point of view proves 
transgressive on a rather more elementary level, when, for example, biological cells are redescribed as factories with 
molecular nanomachinery.
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the nanotechnology that calls for regulation is almost by definition not something that can be known 
now but what is yet to come.    
 The particular objects of nanotechnology are elusive in that they lack a fixed nature – what     
makes them promising for technical applications also makes them unpredictable in regard to other 
potential effects which they might manifest when they interact in new ways with technical and 
biological systems. By the same token, nanotechnology as a whole becomes elusive, and we 
consequently become witness to shifts in what ‘regulation’ is supposed to be. As if the business of 
monitoring, of responsiveness, of the determination and enforcement of safety thresholds were not 
difficult enough, regulation is now called upon for preparedness, foresight, and anticipation. And in 
order to be anticipatory, regulation is drawn from products and manufacturing processes to research 
or even further upstream to visionary declarations of the ambition to interfere with nature in novel 
ways.  9
d) Knowledge Claims 
What kind of knowledge does nanotechnoscience produce? With this question, the philosophy of 
technoscience inherits another problem from the philosophy of science and, once again, it needs to 
provide a distinctive account it differently. A very cursory answer must suffice for present purposes. 
 When one speaks of scientific knowledge, one usually means what is written down in textbooks     
or what represents the current consensus of scientists on a certain topic. In both cases, the 
knowledge that is produced by scientists consists in statements that are determined to be true or 
empirically adequate or rather likely to be true. Normally these statements get written down as 
theories or hypotheses, explanations and descriptions. In contrast, technoscientific knowledge 
consists in the acquisition and demonstration of basic capabilities of visualisation, manipulation, 
modelling, or construction. The typical scientific publication argues that ‘here is evidence to 
confirm or disconfirm an hypothesis.’ The typical technoscientific publication shows that ‘here is 
what we accomplished in our laboratory.’ For example, it is a major achievement in 
nanotechnoscience to do something at room temperature and in atmospheric conditions where 
others required extreme coldness in a vacuum. 
 If knowledge production in the technosciences consists in the development of capabilities but not     
in the advancement of intellectually transparent understanding, what one can do gets ahead of what 
is understood. In the seemingly rather different context of the nuclear arms race, the philosopher 
 An example of this might be the attempt of the European Parliament to establish regulatory standards for nanofoods 9
which run way ahead of current technical capabilities.
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Günter Anders used two Germans words to express this inverted order: herstellen [making] gets 
ahead of vorstellen [imagining] (Anders, 1972, 73 f., compare Anders, 1980).  A great deal of 
scientific knowledge goes into the acquisition of new capabilities and a great deal goes into 
modelling it in some fashion. And yet, what is achieved can be technically robust while remaining 
intellectually opaque. 
 The standard example of technology running ahead of science is the steam engine which was     
developed without a proper understanding of the relation between heat and work (Baird, 2004). This 
understanding came much later and, indeed, was prompted in part by the efficient performance of 
the steam engine. Therefore, the steam engine itself cannot be considered applied science but was 
the result of technical tinkering. It was made of valves, pumps, flywheels, and gears of which there 
was very decent non-scientific craft-knowledge. And though it was assembled in such a piecemeal 
manner, the steam-engine worked just fine before the advent of thermodynamics. In a sense, it did 
not need to be understood since it was firmly rooted in the artisan and technical skills of an 
emerging industrial society. As opposed to the steam engine, nanotechnological devices (whatever 
they will be), genetically modified organisms, or drug delivery systems are rooted in an emerging 
knowledge society. They are not made of artisan valves and pumps but assembled from ‘scientific’ 
components such as algorithms, measuring and monitoring devices with plenty of knowledge built 
in, as well as  the skills of academically educated engineers (Winsberg, 2006, 2009). The science 
that goes into algorithms or sensors is well-understood, as were the valves and gears of the 
eighteenth century. Of the interactions among all the components and of their sensitivities within 
the overall technical system one knows as little perhaps as about the relation of heat and work in the 
eighteenth century – there are theories and elementary conceptions, of course, but a steep learning-
curve still ahead. And yet, like the steam-engine the nanotechnological devices or drug delivery 
systems may work just fine without being fully understood. And though one lacks positive 
knowledge from which to derive or predict the performance of these devices, it may well be 
possible to assess their robustness.  
 For regulatory purposes this might mean that one should not try to infer from knowledge of the     
components to the behavior of the system – that is, that the regulation of components or (chemical) 
substances perhaps ought to give way to the regulation of whole devices, products, or systems. If 
the toxicological effects of nanoparticles elude the grasp of knowledge and imagination, it might yet 
be possible to assess the soundness of a manufacturing process or the safety of a cleaning agent – 
just as it was possible to define through trial and error the safe working of a steam-engine in the 
eighteenth century. 
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II.  THE REGIME OF PERMANENT VIGILANCE 
So far, this chapter entertained questions that have been associated traditionally with the philosophy 
of science. Having arrived at the notion that one may be able to assess the robustness of a system 
even in the absence of thorough understanding, a new set of questions appears  belonging to the 
philosophy of experiment and the philosophy of technology.  
a) Collective Experimentation  
After debating theories and objects, knowledge and method, philosophers took an interest in 
scientific and technoscientific experiments. A traditional account of scientific experimentation will 
emphasise that in the experiment a theory or hypothesis is put to the test, and that this test will 
result in the confirmation or falsification of the hypothesis. More recent accounts attend to the 
technical difficulties and accomplishments of experiments. Quite independently of what 
experiments are used for, they consist first and foremost in the stabilisation of a phenomenon in a 
laboratory – experiments make something observable, measurable, and replicable that does not exist 
as such outside controlled laboratory conditions. This is surely what nanotechnological experiments 
do, too. Indeed, one might say that this experimental achievement is the beginning and end of 
nanotechnology (Nordmann, 2006c). When Don Eigler and Erhard Schweizer moved 35 xenon 
atoms to spell the letters I-B-M they referred to this as ‘The Beginning’ because they managed for 
the first time to make individual atoms obey a rather arbitrary and very human assignment.  By 10
doing so, they anticipated the most ambitious purpose or end of nanotechnology – namely to extend 
this kind of control to the construction of useful devices that could survive outside of the laboratory. 
Similarly, when Mark Reed and James Tour first passed in 1997 a current through a single organic 
molecule, they anticipated a new generation of computers with molecular wiring. And so with all 
the novel phenomena and surprising properties that are discovered in nanotechnological laboratories 
– they mark the beginning of a process of ‘delocalization’ (Galison, 1997). Phenomena leave their 
place of origin and become delocalised by being stabilised in the laboratory, then rendered robust 
enough to be reproducible under varying conditions in other laboratories, then scaled up and moved 
out of the laboratory altogether into the world at large of technical devices.  
 This process of delocalisation aims for a seamless transition from laboratory to market-place as     
technical processes or phenomena become more robust or viable. It is therefore misleading to 
 Eigler’s and Schweizer’s ‘The Beginning’ is on display at the Almaden STM-gallery. See  http://10
www.almaden.ibm.com/vis/stm/atomo.html
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imagine that these processes and phenomena are brought to completion in the scientific laboratory 
and then handed over or ‘transferred’ to engineers and commercial development. Instead, the world 
at large is just a bigger laboratory in which these processes and phenomena can prove themselves. 
This picture of technoscientific progress supports more general accounts of social experimentation 
with new technologies in society as a laboratory. According to these accounts, the consumers who 
eagerly buy the newest communication tools are engaged in a large-scale experiment that 
determines whether these gadgets undermine social cohesion or enhance effective information 
flows. Similarly, citizens who support public investment in nanotechnological research are engaged 
in a large-scale experiment that determines whether this kind of research leads to economic growth 
or to new environmental hazards. Consumers and citizens are thus the guinea pigs in their own 
collective experiments with new technologies (see Schwarz and Krohn, forthcoming; von Poel, 
2009). A poignant formulation of this condition can be found in the report Taking European 
Knowledge Society Seriously by an expert-group of scholars who study science, technology, and 
society: 
 If society is now the laboratory, then everyone is an experimental guinea-pig, but also a potential      
experimental designer and practitioner. Whose experiments we are involved in, and what is being 
tested, are mostly confused, blind and inadvertent, and open-ended. We have not yet even 
acknowledged that this is the state we are in, as a prelude to defining what kinds of experiment, 
to what ends, under what conditions, are acceptable. Basic democratic principles require that this 
new realization be acknowledged, and acted-upon. We suggest that in early 21st century 
conditions this societally distributed capacity is in need of deliberate development, in the face of 
intensifying techno-scientific demands on our trust and credulity (Felt et al., 2007: 71)  
It is tempting to dismiss as merely metaphorical the notion of collective experimentation in society 
as a laboratory. But to acknowledge ‘that this is the state we are in’ requires taking the idea of 
laboratory experimentation literally (Krohn and Weyer, 1994; compare Groß, Hoffmann-Riem, 
Krohn, 2005, and Groß, 2009).  As with all laboratories, this one is standardised in a variety of 11
ways, and as with all experiments, these require systematic observation to support a learning 
process. Though they may enter the experimental condition somewhat unwittingly, societies 
appropriate new technologies over the course of time by learning to live with them. If the 
experiment with cellular phones produces a new type and increased frequency of traffic accidents, 
for example, driving with hand-held phones becomes outlawed and a new generation of car-phones 
 These authors acknowledge various precursors to the idea of social and collective experimentation, especially John 11
Dewey, the Chicago School of Sociology, and Donald Campbell. These authors emphasized the merits of bringing an 
experimental attitude to social learning. In contrast, current discussions emphasize a general condition of societies that 
cannot confine experiments to the laboratory or other carefully circumscribed situations.
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is developed – and the learning process continues with these. For such learning to proceed, 
however, proper institutions are requires for the more or less systematic observation of the 
collective experiment. In the case of nanotechnologies, the question of regulation is tied in with the 
search for such institutions. There is on the one hand the sceptical question whether current methods 
of data-collection, registration, and monitoring will prove to be adequate; and there is on the other 
hand the search for new instruments such as codes of conduct, observatories, public engagement 
exercises, citizens or consumer conferences, and ‘ELSA’-research on ethical, legal, social aspects of 
nanotechnologies. Though vaguely defined and lacking proper agency, these new institutions serve 
a general form of permanent vigilance.  Without knowing what precisely one is looking for and 12
what small or large catastrophes may loom, these institutions cultivate a general sense of somewhat 
anxious and simultaneously reassuring preparedness. Just as everyone is a guinea-pig, so everyone 
is an experimenter or a stakeholder, and all stakeholders are invited to contribute to the responsible 
development of nanotechnology and thus, everyone is on their toes all the time to jump on issues as 
they may arise. This generalised attitude takes the form of statements like these: ‘We can't promise 
that nanoparticles will not pose harzards similar to those of asbestos, but we do promise that this 
time around we would catch this much faster’ (compare Gee and Greenberg, 2001).  
 With open-ended social learning in society as a laboratory arise further questions that concern     
the ethics and politics of collective experimentation. There is firmly in place a codified ethics for 
classical experiments that involve human-subjects, especially in the case of clinical trials. These 
require informed consent, for example, and criteria for the conditions under which the experiment 
should be discontinued. Sheila Jasanoff (2002) has suggested that for collective experimentation in 
democratic societies informed consent will need to be replaced by informed dissent – but what shall 
be done if there appears to be no serious dissent, as in the case of the current world-wide 
experiment with nanotechnologies (Nordmann and Schwarz, 2010)? And arguably, criteria for 
calling off collective experiments can be developed from the precautionary principle. But beyond 
these somewhat superficial suggestions, the analogies and disanalogies between clinical trials and 
collective experiments should be developed in a more sustained and rigorous manner. In particular, 
the immersive aspect of experimentation in the laboratories of technoscience and society deserve to 
be explored. Where the experimenters and observers are also the guinea pigs and vice versa, where 
 At the European Commission and in regard to its proposed Code of Conduct, René von Schomberg views this quite 12
explicitly as institution-building and talks of ‘organizing co-responsibility’ such that above and beyond participating in 
‘responsible development of nanotechnologies’ stakeholders and societal actors develop obligations towards one 
another (Schomberg, 2009). It is in this respect that the notion of ‘responsible innovation’ aims in a similar fashion for 
the creation of corporate accountability (Davies, MacNaghthen, Kearnes, 2009). For a methodological reconstruction of 
‘permanent vigilance’ in the context of social learning and ecological design see also Groß (2010).
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experiments do not serve the advancement of truth but the experience and management of 
surprising features and effects, the mode and manner of experiencing and observing the experiments 
becomes crucially important. 
b) Observatories and other Agencies 
To be sure, any kind of intervention in a social context can be considered an experiment. Whether or 
not this is appropriate depends entirely on the extent to which one can take this label literally.  One 13
way of taking the label literally was illustrated just now and consists in pursuing the ethics of 
human experimentation at the different scales of clinical trial and collective experiments. Others 
ways have been proposed by social reformer Jane Addams in 1909, by the Chicago School of 
sociology which considered the city as a site for social experimentation, and by Donald Campbell 
who developed a detailed program for treating social and political reforms as experiments – here, 
the systematic variation of parameters and comparison to controls plays a role (Groß, 2009; Park, 
Burgess, McKenzie, 1925; Campbell, 1969). For the present purposes and for the philosophy of 
nanotechnoscience, the notion of collective experimentation is inextricably bound up with the 
regime of vigilance, that is, with a more or less systematic way of observing the experiment in order 
to learn from it, if only by way of ad hoc adjustments in real time. 
 Aside from asking what scientific and technoscientific experiments are and how nanoscale     
researchers engage in experiments, philosophers have been interested in the question of observation. 
What is scientific observation and what is going on when scientists or technoscientists observe one 
of their experiments? Even for observation with the naked eye it has been shown that it is neither 
passive nor neutral but, in the words of Norwood Russell Hanson (1965), ‘theory-laden’. When we 
see the sun rising and setting, our observation corresponds to an implicit theory when we ‘should’ 
be seeing the earth turning against the sun. And when a lay-person looks at a prepared tissue 
sample, she tends to see nothing at all, whereas the trained eyes of the pathologist comprehend the 
situation immediately and seemingly without an explicit act of interpretation. 
 The difficult, perhaps intractable question of immediate, yet theory-laden observation becomes     
more difficult even in the case of technoscience and in the case of observing the collective 
experiment with nanotechnologies in society. One of the most famous philosophical essays about 
scientific observations asks ‘Do we see through a microscope?’ (Hacking, 1981). In this essay, Ian 
 Compare, for example, the strenuous objection by Günter Anders to consider the introduction of nuclear arms an 13
experiment for (and on) humanity. Since scientific experiments are usually contained in laboratories and since they are 
meant to be replicable, he found the analogy wholly misleading (Anders, 1980).
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Hacking considers light as well as electron microscopy and argues that we might not see ‘through’ 
an electron microscope as through a tube but that we see ‘with’ all advanced microscopes. We see 
with them because seeing is not merely passive or reactive but is based on strategic interventions: 
we literally throw light at what we are hoping to see and utilise laws of refraction to receive an 
image that we can interpret. Therefore even in 19th century light microscopy observation was 
wrapped up with an experimental intervention of sorts. And though electron microscopy might 
appear more mediated and inferential than light microscopy, this does not make it less reliable: 
indeed, one of the ways in which electron microscopy is highly inferential is the fact that it is 
calibrated to light microscopy: electron microscopy is set up in such a way that it agrees with light 
microscopy. So even where, in the end, one does not look through a lense but at a display screen, 
the display gives us a way of seeing the world much as a television set does. For the expert, then, 
scientific observation involves a technically contrived effortlessness or mediated immediacy – it is 
conceptually complicated and perceptually simple. 
 With regard to nanotechnologies, Hacking's question should now be extended to read ‘Do we see     
through a scanning tunnelling microscope’? One of the distinctive features of the STM is that it is 
used to intervene not only by making visible but also by way of manipulating the objects under 
observation.  One of the earliest publications about nanotechnology featured one of Don Eigler's 14
famous STM images and notes in the caption: ‘Using a tool known as a scanning tunnelling 
microscope (STM), the wave nature of electrons becomes visible to the naked eye. Here, the 
electrons are confined by a ring of 48 atoms individually positioned with the same STM used to 
image them’ (Amato, 1999: 2). A second distinctive feature of STM microscopy consists in its 
twofold calibration. Its data set is calibrated to electron microscopy on the one hand, and on the 
other hand its visual output is calibrated to topographic software that is used in geography, 
simulation modelling and video gaming – this software is best suited for the representation of what 
goes on at the surface of a body. Aside from providing the pleasure of experiencing a very familiar-
looking space that stands ready to be colonised by nanotechnology, it stacks the deck in favour of 
inferences from the likeness of STM-images and theoretical models in a computer simulation. 
Tellingly, these distinctive features make the STM conceptually even more complicated but 
perceptually even simpler than electron microscopy. In a recent interview, one of the inventors of 
the STM therefore notes as the most striking feature of nanotechnology that for a new generation of 
 To be sure, electron microscopy can also be used to displace individual atoms. But in contrast to scanning tunnelling 14
and atomic force microscopy, this capability does not enter into questions regarding the reliability or trustworthiness of 
the observational tool.
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scientists ‘playing with atoms’ has become perfectly straightforward  – because perceptual ease 15
and ease of manipulation makes one forget all the conceptual complicatedness. 
 Philosophers tell different stories when they consider whether the case of the STM is just another     
small step in the history of microscopy or whether it poses entirely new questions (see, for example, 
Pitt, 2004; Rehmann-Sutter, 2008). But they all agree that it involves an interplay between active 
intervention and passive submission or, to put it philosophically, between spontaneity and 
receptivity. Indeed, this attitude of the observer informs the general orientation towards objects of 
nanoscale research: interesting properties that might provide technical functionality are actively 
sought out by researchers who are hoping to be surprised by the phenomena they produce. Also, the 
appearance of specific phenomena and processes requires hard work and careful control, but the 
familiar visual frame of the ‘surfacescape,’ for example, opens up an unbounded space for the 
emergence of novelty and surprise.  
 This interplay is probably not new or specific to nanotechnologies but it holds equally for     
observational control at the nanoscale and for ‘observational control’ of the publics that are required 
to support and maintain nanoscale research. At this point in time, observation of the collective 
experiment consists mostly of luring unsuspecting publics into a space of technical possibility and 
confronting them with long lists of possibly forthcoming applications of nanotechnology. Therefore, 
various observatories of nanotechnology are not so much observing the collective experiment but 
noting technological trends and promises and, at best, attendant public expectations and anxieties. 
Where politically minded publics call for systematic and enforceable oversight and regulation, these 
observatories retreat to something much weaker than that.  However, since due to the complexities 16
of nanoscale phenomena classical regulatory approaches might fail to gain traction, a more rigorous 
mode of observation and thereby a more deliberate form of collective experimentation and social 
learning appear to be required. 
 A rather principled philosophical consideration may have very practical implications for the     
development of an appropriate model of observation. If one reconsiders the history of ‘seeing with 
microscopes’ one might say that much of it was concerned with realism or truth: Straightforward 
seeing is associated with seeing how things are, whereas a highly theory-laden and inferential mode 
of perception suggests that what we see is a construct of sorts.  The reliability of a way of seeing – 17
 The statement by Gerd Binnig has been on view at the Expedition Zukunft mobile science exhibition organized by the 15
Max Planck Gesellschaft during 2009 in Germany.
 See Gammel, Lösch, Nordmann (2009) on various models of ‘observation’ that have been implemented on a variety 16
of observatories.
 To be sure, more sustained reflections of microscopy indicate that the question about realism and truth is based on a 17
misleading dichotomy. For much instrument-aided observation one can say that it does not provide straightforward 
access to something given, but that it is not therefore an inferential construction of something contrived.
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with the electron microscope, for example – was judged in comparison to apparently 
straightforward cases of immediate perception. But the two features of the STM drive home that the 
reliability of the observation depends not on representational features but on the technical 
robustness and performance of the system. Though STM microscopy is even more inferential than 
electron microscopy, the fact that it is also an instrument of intervention and the fact of its twofold 
calibration indicate that it cannot be likened to a human observer who confronts an outside reality 
and wonders whether a mental image provides a truthful representation. Instead, the STM is 
coordinated with a multitude of other instruments and procedures and is judged by the way it agrees 
with and improves upon a whole system of observational and experimental techniques. Firmly 
entrenched in a variety of contexts and practices, the STM is not so much a method of seeing atoms 
on surfaces but an ‘apparatus-world complex’ that affords perceptual and manipulative access to 
atoms on surfaces.  Similarly, collective experimentation with emerging nanotechnologies also 18
requires a robust system of observation that is tied to various institutions and interests and that is 
simultaneously a way of seeing and of acting in the world. Rather than registering potential hazards 
and public concerns, a systematic observation of our collective experiments should afford a kind of 
institutional robustness or a system of tracking and steering nanotechnological developments. 
When, for example, a commercial ‘nano’-product sends users to the hospital for respiratory distress, 
an observation of this event should do more than merely represent what happened – what did the 
media report, what did the toxicologists conclude, how did the stock market react. Instead, it needs 
to view this incident as an experimental situation that served to probe the robustness of the regime 
of vigilance that is to ensure a social learning process – how effectively did existing regulatory 
institutions, governmental agencies, public media and the scientific community respond to this 
incident, what was learned and what deficits can be identified? To make these assessments, to raise 
and answer these questions, an appropriate institution is needed. 
CONCLUSION 
When politicians, NGOs or citizen panels call for the regulation of nanotechnology, they often have 
a rather simple and familiar picture in mind: If products come to market with nanotechnology 
inside, regulatory tools should offer assurance that all marketed products are safe. The philosophy 
of nanotechnoscience tells us that this expectation will not be met – not simply because of the 
 See Rom Harré for an account of the difference between instruments that function like probes (the thermometer, the 18
light microscope) and a complex of apparatus and world that makes a phenomenon available for research and 
development, for observation and intervention. Of the latter complexes he says that they afford a phenomenon much 
like yeast, water and an oven afford us a loaf of bread (Harré, 2003).
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heterogeneity of all the various technologies, processes, or products that might come under the 
heading of ‘nanotechnology.’ It is not at all clear what it means for a product to have 
nanotechnology inside: Does it contain nanoparticles and, if yes, are these nanoparticles sufficiently 
alike to afford general statements about their toxicological properties in the various places where 
they might end up? Were nanotechnological processes used in the manufacture of this product and 
how, if at all, did these change the properties and behaviours of the product? Does the product have 
nanostructured surfaces that might interact with biological systems? Do the slightest variations 
within the margin of tolerance for the manufacture of any two samples of the same product make a 
relevant difference regarding their properties and behaviours? Such questions and the more general 
considerations stated above indicate that the kind of knowledge that can be acquired about 
nanotechnoscientific objects does not allow for general conclusions about definite behaviours 
including the health-effects of large, well-defined classes of things. As has been suggested in these 
pages, the reason for this can be found in the nature or ontology of those objects, in the complexity 
of interactions at the nanoscale, and in the orientation of nanotechnoscience towards surprising 
properties and technical possibilities rather than structural constraints and an assessments of limits. 
 The news is not all bad, however. Where regulation, classically conceived, cannot gain traction,     
one does not therefore need to retreat all the way to passive observation of technological trends, 
citizens' concerns, or the collective experiment with nanotechnology. Instead, the practices of 
nanotechnoscience and the notion of collective experimentation suggest strategies for strengthening 
the regime of permanent vigilance. For example, scanning probe microscopy provides a model for 
an observational practice that is conceptually intractable and that leaves many questions about 
representational accuracy unanswered but that is nevertheless reliable and robust. Similarly, one 
might envision a ‘scanning probe agency’ as an institution of permanent vigilance which permits 
monitoring and intervention without relying on the availability of knowledgeable risk 
assessments.  This agency works by scanning the ‘surfacescape’ of nanotechnological trends and 19
developments, programs and debates, and by rigorously probing within this horizon experimental 
situations that test the capability of society to deal effectively with nanotechnologies. It thereby 
develops deliberative capacities that allow for active intervention in the societal and technical 
development of nanotechnologies. But regardless of whether some such model becomes 
implemented or not, there is a middle ground between classical regulation and the various voluntary 
schemes of soft law. It can be found by probing the robustness of a system of institutions, 
 For a more extensive development of this particular proposal see Lösch, Gammel, Nordmann (2009).19
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observational techniques, and vigilant stakeholders that are implicated in our collective experiment 
with nanotechnologies.  20
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